Symbol U
U is part of the quantity the equation computes from the expression on the right.
Read this term in its guide →Published equation contexts
Why this formula appears here
A matrix of pairwise advantages is an invitation to ask what a population that only cared about that matrix would converge on. Convert E into a genuine zero-sum payoff by taking a log-ratio: U(i,j) = \!E(i,j)/E(j,i) , which is antisymmetric by construction ( U(i,j) = -U(j,i) ) and reads in doublings of relative advantage — U(i,j)=2 means i ’s best attack into j outclasses j ’s best attack into i by a factor of four. This is a standard move in evolutionary game theory, and this piece does not pretend to invent the tool: this house has already used replicator dynamics to model real market selection and a matched null-model discipline to test claims of selection against chance,…
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Symbol i
i is an argument of the function-like quantity on the left; its role is set by that function’s stated inputs.
Read this term in its guide →Symbol j
j is an argument of the function-like quantity on the left; its role is set by that function’s stated inputs.
Read this term in its guide →How to interpret it
Read it with the definitions, units, and assumptions supplied by the article.
Published contexts (1)
A symbol can carry a different meaning in another article. Each occurrence keeps its own guide and term definitions.
Equation 8 · Pokémon Formal Machinery
The Type Chart Is a Payoff Matrix, and the Metagame Only Half-Solves It
This equation states an equality: the expressions on both sides have the same value under the article’s assumptions.
A matrix of pairwise advantages is an invitation to ask what a population that only cared about that matrix would converge on. Convert E into a genuine zero-sum payoff by taking a log-ratio: U(i,j) = \!E(i,j)/E(j,i) , which is antisymmetric by construction ( U(i,j) = -U(j,i) ) and reads in doublings of relative advantage — U(i,j)=2 means i ’s best attack into j outclasses j ’s best attack into i by a factor of four. This is a standard move in evolutionary game theory, and this piece does not pretend to invent the tool: this house has already used replicator dynamics to model real market selection and a matched null-model discipline to test claims of selection against chance,…
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